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Incomplete contracting theory suggests that venture capitalist (VC) cash ﬂow rights,
including liquidation preferences, could be subject to renegotiation. Using a handcollected data set of sales of Silicon Valley ﬁrms, we ﬁnd common shareholders do
sometimes receive payment before VCs’ liquidation preferences are satisﬁed. However,
such deviations from VCs’ cash ﬂow rights tend to be small. We also ﬁnd that
renegotiation is more likely when governance arrangements, including the ﬁrm’s choice
of corporate law, give common shareholders more power to impede the sale. Our study
provides support for incomplete contracting theory, improves understanding of VC exits,
and suggests that choice of corporate law matters in private ﬁrms.
& 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Venture capitalists (VCs) typically invest through
convertible preferred stock (Kaplan and Strömberg,
2003; Sahlman, 1990). The stock’s liquidation preferences
entitle VCs to be paid before common shareholders
(including a ﬁrm’s current managers, its founders, and
other employees) when the ﬁrm is sold or dissolved
(Barclay and Smith, 1995). If the ﬁrm is sold privately for a
sufﬁciently high price or conducts an initial public
offering (IPO), the VCs will convert their preferred stock
into common stock at a pre-speciﬁed ratio (Hellmann,
2006).
However, VCs’ cash ﬂow rights could be subject to
renegotiation in the most common form of exit: a private
sale of the ﬁrm (Cumming, Fleming, and Schwienbacher,
2006). Managers and other common shareholders might
use their positions on the board and other control rights to
hold up a sale of the ﬁrm, particularly when satisfaction of
the VCs’ liquidation preferences would leave little for
common shareholders. Incomplete contracting theory
(Aghion and Bolton, 1992; Hart, 1995) suggests that this
threat of holdup could lead VCs to carve out part of their
cash ﬂow rights for common stockholders (Hellmann,
2006).1
Unfortunately, there is little evidence on how VCs’ cash
ﬂow rights perform in private sales. Are VCs’ cash ﬂow
rights renegotiated in private sales, and, if so, are such
renegotiations caused by common stockholders’ holdup
power?
To answer these questions, we use a hand-collected
data set of 50 VC-backed Silicon Valley ﬁrms sold to
acquirers in 2003 and 2004. These ﬁrms were all hightech businesses, primarily in the biotech, telecommunications, software, and Internet sectors. Although the average
sale price was $55 million, there was considerable
variance in outcomes. Some sales were essentially
liquidations, yielding only several hundred thousand
dollars, while other ﬁrms were sold for well over $100
million. For each ﬁrm, we gather data on the allocation of
control rights and cash ﬂow rights from the initial VC
ﬁnancing to the sale. We then examine the distribution of
sale proceeds among the VCs and the original common
shareholders. We can thus compare VCs’ cash ﬂow rights
at the time of sale to the amounts they receive.
We ﬁnd that in most sales there is no renegotiation:
VCs receive their full cash ﬂow rights. In 11 of the sales,
however, VCs carve out part of their cash ﬂow rights for

1
Renegotiation is sometimes seen in bankruptcy, where common
shareholders can use their holdup power to extract part of creditors’ cash
ﬂow rights. Studies ﬁnding deviations from creditors’ contractual
priority in bankruptcy proceedings include Warner (1977), Franks and
Torous (1989), Weiss (1990), LoPucki and Whitford (1990), Eberhart,
Moore, and Roenfeldt (1990), Betker (1995), and Tashjian, Lease, and
McConnell (1996). Subsequent work suggests that these deviations
result from equity’s holdup power, the legal right of equityholders in
Chapter 11 to delay or prevent the adoption of a plan of reorganization
(Bebchuk and Chang, 1992; and Bebchuk, 2002). Bankruptcy distributions in jurisdictions that do not provide equity with similar holdup
power are generally consistent with creditors’ priority rights (Franks,
Nyborg, and Torous, 1996; Davydenko and Franks, 2006).
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common shareholders. In these cases, all of which involve
the VCs exiting as preferred shareholders, the average
carveout is $3.7 million, approximately 11% of the VCs’
cash ﬂow rights. Across all 50 ﬁrms, the average carveout
is 2.3% (1.9% dollar-weighted). Our study suggests that
VCs’ cash ﬂow rights are generally reliable in private sales,
even when the VCs exit as preferred shareholders and are
most vulnerable to holdup.2
We also show that the likelihood and magnitude of
deviations from VCs’ cash ﬂow rights in favor of common
shareholders are larger when common shareholders have
more power vis-a -vis the VCs. Everything else equal, the
expected deviation is about $1.5 million larger if VCs lack
a board majority and roughly $1.6 million larger if the
state corporate law chosen by the ﬁrm gives common
shareholders relatively more leverage against the VCs
through that state’s bundle of common shareholder rights.
This suggests that such deviations are driven, at least in
part, by the allocation of control within the ﬁrm.
Our ﬁndings linking common shareholder power to
deviations from VCs’ cash ﬂow rights are generally robust
to alternative econometric speciﬁcations. We estimate the
sensitivity of our results to omitted variable bias using a
technique developed by Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005).
Application of their technique to our study suggests that
the relation between common shareholder power and
deviations from VCs’ cash ﬂow rights is not spurious.
Our study makes several contributions. First, it sheds
light on how VCs exit their investments through private
sales. While researchers have extensively studied VC exits
through IPOs (Barry, Muscarella, Peavy, and Vetsuypens,
1990; Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Lee and Wahal, 2004;
Gompers, 1996) and theorized about private sales (Berglöf,
1994; Bascha and Walz, 2001; Hellmann, 2006), little is
known about how VCs exit through these sales even
though they are the most common form of VC exit. Our
ﬁndings suggest that, when exiting through a sale, VCs
generally have sufﬁcient control to realize their full cash
ﬂow rights. However, VCs sometimes need to pay
common shareholders to obtain their support for the
proposed sale, and the likelihood of such renegotiation is
higher when VCs have less control. Our ﬁndings are
consistent with Hellmann (2006), who predicts that such
renegotiations are more likely to occur in ﬁrms in which
VCs lack complete control and exit holding preferred stock
with liquidation preferences.
Second, our study provides support for the incomplete
ﬁnancial contracting literature, particularly Aghion and
Bolton (1992). Aghion and Bolton show that investors
might give entrepreneurs some holdup power to improve
subsequent decision making. The investors might then
need to give up part of their cash ﬂow rights to the
entrepreneur ex post to obtain support for an action
favored by the investors, such as a sale of the ﬁrm.

2
By contrast, in bankruptcy, where common shareholders can use
their holdup power to extract part of creditors’ cash ﬂow rights,
deviations from absolute priority are more common and of larger
magnitude, with some studies ﬁnding deviations in approximately 70%
of bankruptcy proceedings, and an average deviation of 7.6% (Weiss,
1990; Eberhart, Moore, and Roenfeldt, 1990).
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Consistent with their model, we ﬁnd that the parties
allocate some holdup power to the entrepreneur and
other common shareholders; there is sometimes renegotiation upon exit; the renegotiation involves the investors
giving up part of their cash ﬂow rights; and the
renegotiation is driven, at least in part, by the pre-sale
allocation of control rights. While other researchers
(Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003) show how the allocation
of control rights in start-ups is consistent with Aghion and
Bolton (1992), our paper is the ﬁrst to show that the
allocation of control affects the likelihood and extent of
deviation from VCs’ cash ﬂow rights in the direction
predicted by their model.
Third, our study provides evidence that start-up ﬁrms’
choice of corporate law matters. There is some evidence
that differences in corporate law within the US and across
countries affect the value of common stock in public
companies (Daines, 2001; Subramanian, 2004; La Porta,
Lopez-DeSilanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 2002). However, no
studies examine whether corporate law also affects
ﬁnancial outcomes in VC-backed ﬁrms or in any other
type of private company. Our study is the ﬁrst to suggest
that the choice of corporate law matters in private ﬁrms.
In particular, corporate law that gives common shareholders more leverage might enable them to increase their
payouts ex post (at the expense of preferred shareholders)
when the ﬁrm is sold.
Our study does not address the performance of VCs’
cash ﬂow rights generally. We do not examine VCs’ ability
to realize their cash ﬂow rights in IPOs, where the payout
to the original common shareholders is likely to be large,
and holdup therefore less likely. We also do not consider
the performance of VCs’ cash ﬂow rights in dissolutions
(which are generally not publicly reported). We expect
that, if such exits were included, the ex ante deviation
from VCs’ cash ﬂow rights around exit would be even
lower. Finally, we abstract from changes in VCs’ cash ﬂow
rights that might take place long before exit. For example,
VCs might agree to reduce their liquidation preferences to
facilitate a new round of ﬁnancing. We focus only on the
performance of VCs’ cash ﬂow rights as of the time of
private sale.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 describes the potential conﬂict between VCs and
common shareholders when a sale of the ﬁrm is
contemplated. It also develops testable hypotheses regarding the effect of common shareholder power on VCs’
ability to fully realize their cash ﬂow rights in a sale.
Section 3 describes our data set. Section 4 describes the
deviations from VCs’ cash ﬂow rights observed in our
sample. Section 5 tests ours hypotheses regarding the link
between common shareholder power and such deviations,
describes our ﬁndings, and offers robustness checks.
Section 6 concludes.

control rights between VCs and common shareholders is
likely to affect VCs’ ability to realize their cash ﬂow rights
upon the sale of the ﬁrm.
2.1. VCs’ cash ﬂow and control rights
VCs invest in start-ups almost exclusively through
convertible preferred stock while the founders and other
employees hold common stock (Kaplan and Strömberg,
2003). In a liquidity event, such as the sale of the ﬁrm, VCs
holding preferred stock are entitled to be paid the stock’s
liquidation preference in full before common shareholders
receive anything. Alternatively, the VCs can convert their
preferred stock into common stock at a pre-speciﬁed ratio
and be paid as common shareholders. In some instances,
VCs receive participating preferred stock, that entitles
them to both receive a liquidation preference and share
pro rata with common shareholders in any remaining
value generated by the liquidity event, up to a speciﬁed
amount. VCs holding convertible preferred stock, whether
ordinary or participating, will choose to convert into
common stock only if the ﬁrm is sold for a sufﬁciently
high price. In most sales, VCs keep their preferred stock
and receive their liquidation preferences instead of
converting to common.3 Giving VCs preferred stock can
mitigate information asymmetry, improve the entrepreneur’s incentive to exert effort (Sahlman, 1990), and
generate tax beneﬁts for the ﬁrm (Gilson and Schizer,
2003).
VCs typically receive extensive control rights in their
portfolio companies, including protective provisions giving VCs the right to veto certain major transactions, such
as the sale of key assets (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003).
More important, VCs frequently acquire control of the
board. Unlike protective provisions, which give VCs the
power only to block unfavorable transactions, board
control enables VCs to replace managers as well as initiate
fundamental transactions such as sales, IPOs, and dissolutions (Fried and Ganor, 2006). Board control thus enables
VCs to monitor the entrepreneur–manager and ﬁre her if
necessary (Lerner, 1995; Gompers, 1995; Hellmann, 1998)
and assists VCs in exiting their investment over the
entrepreneur–manager’s objection (Smith, 2005).
2.2. Hypotheses: common shareholders’ holdup power
around exit

2. VCs and common shareholders

When VCs seek to exit their investment, they could
face opposition not only from the ﬁrm’s manager (either
the original entrepreneur or a hired professional), but also
from other common shareholders. Common shareholders,
including the manager, might resist a sale for two reasons.
First, sale of the ﬁrm to an acquirer could eliminate the
manager’s position and private beneﬁts (Aghion and
Bolton, 1992). Second, when the VCs exit as preferred
shareholders asserting their liquidation preferences, little

We now describe the potential conﬂict between VCs
and common shareholders around the sale of the ﬁrm, and
we offer two hypotheses about how the allocation of

3
If the ﬁrm’s shares are sold in an IPO the ﬁnancing agreement
typically requires the VCs to convert to common stock even if the
preferred stock would offer a higher payout (Hellmann, 2006).
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might be left for common shareholders as a class. The
common shareholders thus might prefer keeping the ﬁrm
independent in the hope that it is later sold for a higher
price or undergoes an IPO in which the VCs are forced to
convert to common (Hellmann, 2006). To overcome
common shareholder opposition to a sale, the VCs could
agree to give up part of their cash ﬂow rights when they
exit.
Common shareholders’ ability to hold up the VCs
depends, in part, on the allocation of control rights within
the ﬁrm. Incomplete contracting theory suggests the
parties might deliberately allocate control rights to
common shareholders to strengthen their ex post holdup
power. Aghion and Bolton (1992) show that, when the
entrepreneur–manager is wealth-constrained and enjoys
non-ﬁnancial private beneﬁts from the enterprise, giving
some control rights to the manager can improve exit
decisions. The entrepreneur–manager typically holds a
considerable amount of common stock (and, at least
initially, may be the main or only common shareholder).
Thus, allocating control rights to common shareholders as
a class could serve ex post efﬁciency by indirectly giving
some power to the ﬁrm’s entrepreneur–manager.
Similarly, Hellmann (2006) shows that allocating some
control to common shareholders as a group can improve
the choice between private sale (in which the VCs exit
with their liquidation preferences) and an IPO (where the
VCs are forced to convert to common), while preserving
managers’ incentive to generate value.
We now describe how the contractual allocation of two
types of control rights can be used to give common
shareholders more power to hold up a sale, and we offer
hypotheses about how the allocation of each type of right
should affect common shareholders’ ability to capture
some of the VCs’ cash ﬂow rights.
2.2.1. Hypothesis 1: board seats
Under the corporate law of every state, a sale of the
ﬁrm requires approval by a majority of the directors. The
allocation of board seats is determined contractually in
connection with each round of ﬁnancing (Kaplan and
Strömberg, 2003), with seats typically divided among VCs,
common shareholder representatives, and outside directors mutually appointed by the common shareholders and
the VCs.
When VCs have a board majority, they can unilaterally
effect board authorization of a sale. However, VCs lacking
a board majority must obtain the cooperation of at least
one non-VC director to sell the ﬁrm. The price of such
cooperation could involve giving up a portion of their
liquidation preferences to common shareholders. Everything else equal, we predict that when VCs lack a board
majority the expected deviation from VCs’ cash ﬂow rights
is larger. We refer to this as the Board Blocking Hypothesis.
2.2.2. Hypothesis 2: shareholder rights
A second potential source of common shareholders’
holdup power vis-a -vis VCs comes from their corporate
law voting rights and ability to sue directors for breach of
their ﬁduciary duty to shareholders (Fried and Ganor,
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2006). These rights depend on the laws of the state in
which the ﬁrm is incorporated.
Consider ﬁrst common shareholders’ voting rights
under corporate law. Corporate law requires that shareholders approve by majority vote certain structural
changes that substantially alter their investment interest,
including a sale of the ﬁrm. Common shareholders’ ability
to use voting rights to impede a sale may depend on the
strength of these voting rights, which vary from state to
state.
Next consider common shareholders’ ability to sue
directors for breach of ﬁduciary duty. The directors of a
VC-backed ﬁrm, like those of any other corporation, owe a
ﬁduciary duty of loyalty to the ﬁrm and its shareholders.
Depending on the state’s ﬁduciary-duty case law, common
shareholders might have stronger (or weaker) legal
grounds for attacking a sale as a violation of directors’
ﬁduciary duty. The more favorable the law is to common
shareholders, the more likely directors are to structure the
sale in a way that provides a payout to common shareholders.
We predict that incorporation in a jurisdiction that
provides greater legal protection to common shareholders
through voting rights or ﬁduciary duty law leads to
greater deviations from VCs’ cash ﬂow rights. We refer to
this as the Shareholder Rights Hypothesis.
3. The data
We study the effect of common shareholder power on
the performance of VCs’ cash ﬂow rights using a handcollected data set of VC-backed Silicon Valley ﬁrms. This
section describes the data collection process and provides
descriptive statistics of the ﬁrms in our sample.
3.1. Data gathering
We obtained from VentureReporter.net a list of VCﬁnanced companies located in California that were sold to
an acquirer in 2003 or 2004. We ﬁltered out all ﬁrms
except those located in and around San Francisco, San
Jose, and Oakland (broadly deﬁned as ‘‘Silicon Valley’’),
leaving a population of 193 ﬁrms.
For each ﬁrm we sought to locate and obtain data from
one or more persons knowledgeable about the ﬁrm’s life,
from formation to sale. We identiﬁed current business
addresses for the founders or executives (all of whom we
call ‘‘entrepreneurs’’ for convenience) of 141 of the 193
companies. We mailed letters asking entrepreneurs from
each ﬁrm to provide us with data, promising to keep
conﬁdential the identity of the entrepreneur and the startup ﬁrm. We made follow-up phone calls to encourage
participation approximately two weeks after the letter
was sent out.
Entrepreneurs from 57 of the 141 ﬁrms agreed to
provide us with data, a response rate of 40.4%. The
information obtained, supplemented by publicly ﬁled
corporate charters, covered each ﬁrm’s entire lifespan.
Among the data gathered were the state of incorporation,
the cash ﬂow rights and control rights negotiated in each
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VC ﬁnancing round, the identities and backgrounds of the
chief executive ofﬁcer (CEO) and directors, and the terms
of sale, including the amounts paid to various classes of
shareholders.
From the original set of 57 ﬁrms, we removed seven for
lack of adequate data, leaving 50 ﬁrms. In most of these
sales (42 out of 50) the VCs exited as preferred shareholders. In the remaining eight ﬁrms the VCs converted
into common stock in connection with the sale, giving up
their liquidation preferences.

3.2. Selection issues
Our sample is limited to Silicon Valley ﬁrms sold in
2003 or 2004. Factors unique to the Silicon Valley VC
market or to this time period could limit the generalizability of our results. Silicon Valley is a closely knit
community with its own norms and ways of doing
business (Suchman and Cahill, 1996), in which reputational considerations are particularly important (Black
and Gilson, 1998). Our sample ﬁrms were sold several
years after the tech bubble collapsed, a period when VCs
lost considerable amounts of money. These losses could
increase the conﬂict between VCs and common stockholders around exit events. The allocation of proceeds
from the sale of start-ups in our sample could thus reﬂect
not only common shareholder holdup power but also the
post-bubble time period and factors unique to Silicon
Valley.
In addition, our sample consists only of companies
whose entrepreneurs voluntarily responded to our request
for information. Systematic differences could exist between ﬁrms with entrepreneurs who responded to our
inquiries and ﬁrms with entrepreneurs who did not. We
sought to minimize such biases by soliciting data from
every entrepreneur we could locate and offering conﬁdentiality. However, our sample might not be completely
representative of Silicon Valley ﬁrms sold in 2003 and
2004. Because of these representativeness concerns, the
frequency and magnitude of deviations from VCs’ cash
ﬂow rights in our sample ﬁrms could be higher or lower
than they are in other periods and places.

3.3. Sample description
Our sample ﬁrms are high-tech businesses, primarily
in the biotech, software, telecommunications, and
internet sectors (Panel A of Table 1). The concentration of information-technology related businesses is
representative of VC-ﬁnanced ﬁrms generally (Kaplan
and Strömberg, 2003, p. 284). At the time of sale, the
ﬁrms had received an average of $42 million in VC funding
and had been operating for an average of approximately
ﬁve years. The mean sale price was $55 million. Panel B of
Table 1 provides information on the amount invested,
number of ﬁnancing rounds, number of years of operation,
and sale price. Data are shown separately for the full
sample of 50 ﬁrms and for the 42 ﬁrms in which the VCs
held preferred stock and asserted their liquidation

preferences in connection with the sale (the ‘‘VC
preferred sample’’).
3.4. VCs’ cash ﬂow rights
VCs’ aggregate liquidation preferences at the time of
sale are $47 million on average. In the ﬁrst round of
ﬁnancing the liquidation preference usually equals the
amount invested (a 1x preference), while the liquidation
preference in subsequent rounds is more likely to be a
higher multiple (i.e., 2x or 3x) of the amount invested
(Panel C). At the sale, aggregate preferences are on average
somewhat greater than the amount invested (Panel B).
When VCs maintain their preferred stock instead of
converting to common stock, the allocation of the sale
proceeds depends on the relation between the VCs’
liquidation preferences and the sale price. If liquidation
preferences exceed the sale price and contractual priority
is fully respected, common shareholders get nothing.
Liquidation preferences exceed the sale price in 31 of the
42 ﬁrms in which the VCs exited as preferred shareholders
(Panel D). In eight ﬁrms, it was in the VCs’ interest to
convert to common stock instead of maintaining their
liquidation preferences. In these sales, the allocation of
sale proceeds was pro rata among all common shareholders (the original common shareholders and the
converting VCs).
3.5. Common shareholder power
This sub-section describes the extent of common
shareholder power (board seats and corporate law rights)
in our sample ﬁrms. The data are summarized in Table 2.
We then use our data to operationalize each common
shareholder power hypothesis.
3.5.1. Board seats
Common shareholders may have power through their
board representatives. We divide directors into three
categories: VC, common shareholder, and outside director.
Outside directors are typically industry experts mutually
appointed by the VCs and the common shareholders. If a
particular outside director was selected exclusively by the
VCs (common shareholders), we designate this person as a
VC (common shareholder) director. Our de facto classiﬁcation of outside directors differs from the formal
classiﬁcation used by Kaplan and Strömberg (2003),
which treats any board seat intended for a director who
is neither a VC nor a representative of common shareholders as held by an outside director. The use of de facto
instead of formal classiﬁcation does not affect our
econometric results.
Panel A reports the allocation of board seats. At the
time of sale, 56.5% of all directors are appointed by the
VCs and 22.8% are appointed by common stockholders.
Panel B shows that the VCs control the board in 29 of the
50 (58%) ﬁrms. In our sample, common stockholders
rarely control the board at the time of the sale (three of 50
ﬁrms). However, in 21 ﬁrms the combination of outside
directors and common stockholders can block a sale. The
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics and liquidation preferences.
This table provides descriptive statistics for a sample of 50 VC-backed ﬁrms sold in 2003 or 2004. Panel A shows industry distribution. The industry
classiﬁcation is provided by www.linksv.com. Panel B reports the mean and median period of operation, number of ﬁnancing rounds, amount invested,
and sale price for the ﬁrms in our sample. Panel B also shows the aggregate liquidation preferences (LP) held by the VC investors at the time of sale, in
dollar amount and as a ratio of the amount invested and the sale price. Panel C shows the preferences issued in each round of ﬁnancing. The ﬁrst column
lists the number of ﬁnancing rounds that used 1x preferences. The second and third columns list ﬁnancing rounds where preferences between 1x up to 2x
and greater than 2x were used, respectively. The ﬁnal column lists ﬁnancing rounds in which the liquidation preferences of earlier investors were waived
or reduced (a ‘‘recap’’ ﬁnancing). Panel D shows, at the time of sale, the number of companies in which the LP were greater or less than the sale price. Data
are shown separately for the full sample of 50 ﬁrms and for the 42 ﬁrms in which the VCs exited as preferred shareholders (VC preferred sample).
Panel A. Industry distribution of companies
Sample

Biotech

Telecom

Software

Internet

Other

6
5

13
11

12
11

10
8

9
7

Full sample (=50)
VC preferred sample (=42)
Panel B. Financing overview

Full sample (=50)

VC preferred sample (=42)

Variable

Mean

Median

Standard deviation

Mean

Median

Standard deviation

Years of operation
Number of ﬁnancing rounds
Amount invested (millions $)
Sale price (millions $)
Aggregate LP (millions $)
LP divided by amount invested
LP divided by sale price

5.1
3.0
42.2
55.0
46.9
1.24
8.5

5
3
31
24.3
33.5
1
1.5

1.6
1.1
36.7
103.9
38.9
0.63
25.0

5.3
3.1
46.3
47.6
50.2
1.19
10.0

5
3
35.1
19
38.7
1
1.8

1.6
1.1
38.4
108.9
40.2
0.58
27.1

Panel C. Liquidation preferences
Round Number

1x

r2x

42x

Recap

First round (=50)
Second round (=39)
Third round (=24)
Fourth round (=10)
Fifth round (=5)

46
25
15
2
1

2
10
2
2
1

2
3
2
2
0

0
1
5
4
3

Panel D. Relation of liquidation preferences to sale price
Sample
Full sample (=50)
VC preferred sample (=42)

Board Blocking Hypothesis predicts that deviations from
VCs’ cash ﬂow rights are more likely when, as in these 21
ﬁrms, VCs lack board control.
3.5.2. Shareholder rights
All our companies were incorporated in either California
or Delaware at time of sale, consistent with ﬁndings that
most public ﬁrms incorporate either in their home state or
Delaware (Daines, 2002; Bebchuk and Cohen, 2003). Panel C
of Table 2 shows that 35 out of 50 ﬁrms were incorporated
in Delaware at the time of the sale. As we explain below,
California law gives common shareholders somewhat more
power in relation to preferred shareholders through both
voting rights and the threat of ﬁduciary-duty litigation.
Turning ﬁrst to common shareholders’ corporate law
voting rights, California and Delaware provide different
voting rights for shareholders (Fried and Ganor, 2006). In
Delaware, sales need be approved only by holders of a
majority of all the ﬁrm’s outstanding stock, both preferred

LP 4 sale price

LP o sale price

31
31

19
11

and common. Consistent with Kaplan and Strömberg
(2003), we ﬁnd that VCs almost always have sufﬁcient
voting power to dictate the outcome of a stockholderwide vote. In contrast, California requires a separate vote
for each class of shareholders, including common. Thus,
when the VCs remain preferred shareholders, common
shareholders of California-domiciled ﬁrms can more
easily impede a sale they oppose.
However, the difference in voting rights between
California and Delaware might not be as signiﬁcant as it
appears. First, VCs have various techniques for neutralizing common shareholders’ voting power, such as using
corporate funds to acquire a large block of common stock
that can be voted in favor of a sale (Fried and Ganor,
2006).4 Thus, separate class voting might not give

4
VCs can also negotiate for drag-along rights, a contractual
provision under which common shareholders agree to vote for transac-
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Table 2
Control rights.
This table reports the distribution of corporate governance rights in a sample of 50 VC-backed ﬁrms sold in 2003 or 2004. Panel A reports the mean and
median board representation for common shareholders, VCs, and outside directors. Panel B shows board control at the time of sale. If the VCs (or common
shareholders) control more than half the board seats, we classify this as ‘‘Control’’. If the board has an even number of seats and the VCs (or common
shareholders) appoint exactly half the directors, we treat this as ‘‘Blocking’’. ‘‘Shared control’’ means that the VCs and the common shareholders each
appoint fewer than half the directors, with outside directors constituting the tie breaking vote. Panel C shows the state of incorporation at the time of sale.
Panel A. Board seats at time of sale
Full sample (=50)

Total number of board seats
Common seats (percent of board)
VC seats (percent of board)
Outsider seats (percent of board)

VC preferred sample (=42)

Mean

Median

Standard deviation

Mean

Median

Standard deviation

5.74
22.8
56.5
20.7

5
20.0
57.1
20.0

1.52
0.137
0.172
0.185

5.76
20.4
58.6
21.0

5
20.0
57.1
20.0

1.54
0.098
0.174
0.188

Panel B. Distribution of board control
Sample
Full sample (=50)

Common control

Common blocking

Shared control

VC blocking

VC control

3

0

12

6

29

Panel C. State of incorporation at time of sale
Sample
Full sample (=50)

Delaware

California

Other

35

15

0

common shareholders of California-domiciled ﬁrms that
much more holdup power.
Second, and more important, California purports to
subject quasi-California corporations (corporations doing
business in California but incorporated elsewhere) to the
requirement of a separate class vote.5 While California’s
legal ability to impose this requirement on ﬁrms incorporated elsewhere is contested, many (but not all) Delawareincorporated companies located in California are advised
by lawyers to hold a separate class vote. In our sample, all
but one Delaware-incorporated ﬁrm held a separate class
vote for the common.
Thus, as a practical matter, California (as opposed to
Delaware) incorporation may not give common shareholders much more power through voting rights. Nevertheless, common shareholders’ ability to impede a
transaction is still likely to be somewhat greater in a
California-incorporated ﬁrm, where a separate class vote
is indisputably mandatory.
Turning next to common shareholders’ ability to
threaten directors with ﬁduciary duty litigation, California’s
substantive law makes it easier for common shareholders
to prevail in a lawsuit against a board controlled by VCs
than Delaware’s (Fried and Ganor, 2006). Delaware law
permits a VC-controlled board to make decisions that favor
preferred shareholders at the expense of the common, as
long as the decisions can plausibly be defended as being in

(footnote continued)
tions backed by the VCs under certain conditions. Drag-along rights were
not widely used during the period when most of our sample ﬁrms were
ﬁnanced but have become more common in recent years.
5
See Cal. Corp Code 2115(b) (West 1990).

the best interests of the corporation. In contrast, California
law generally affords stronger protection to minority
shareholders, including common shareholders in ﬁrms
with VC-controlled boards. Thus, directors of Californiadomiciled ﬁrms might believe they face greater risk of
liability for harming common shareholders.
Because both common shareholders’ voting rights and
ﬁduciary-duty rights are somewhat stronger in California
than in Delaware, we operationalize the Shareholder Rights
Hypothesis based on whether the ﬁrm was incorporated in
California rather than in Delaware at the time of sale.

4. Deviations from VCs’ cash ﬂow rights: evidence
In this section we describe deviations from VCs’ cash
ﬂow rights in our sample. We compare the actual payout
received by VCs to their contractual entitlement. If the VCs
convert to common shares, their contractual entitlement
equals their pro rata share of the sale price. If the VCs exit
as preferred shareholders, their contractual entitlement is
the lesser of their liquidation preferences and the sale
price. In those cases in which the sale price exceeds the
liquidation preferences and the VCs exit holding participating preferred stock, we deﬁne VCs’ cash ﬂow rights as
the sum of their liquidation preferences and their
participation rights. For each ﬁrm, we calculate the
fraction of the VCs’ cash ﬂow rights actually paid to the
VCs (the Realization Rate). To illustrate, if the VCs are
entitled to $20 million at a given sale price but receive
only $18 million, the Realization Rate is 0.9 (i.e., 18/20). Our
null hypothesis is that Realization Rate equals one for each
ﬁrm (i.e., cash ﬂow rights are fully respected).
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Table 3
Deviation from VCs’ cash ﬂow rights.
This table describes deviations from VCs’ cash ﬂow rights in a sample of 50 VC-backed ﬁrms sold in 2003 or 2004. The ﬁrst two rows provide summary
statistics on the carveout payment (in millions of dollars) and VCs’ realization rate for the full sample (=50). The last two rows provide the same
data, limited to companies in which a deviation occurred (Deviation sub-sample (=11)). The included summary statistics are mean, dollar-weighted mean
(DW mean), median, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum. DW mean is weighted by the ﬁrm’s sale price and applies only to realization rate.
Full sample (=50)

Mean

DW mean

Median

Standard deviation

Minimum

Maximum

Carveout to common
Realization rate

0.81
0.977

–
0.981

0
1

2.20
0.059

0
0.733

10
1

Deviation sub-sample (=11)
Carveout to common
Realization rate

3.70
0.893

–
0.896

2.5
0.9

3.44
0.087

0.03
0.733

10
0.99

Sale proceeds (in millions of dollars)

100
Payout to VCs
Carveout to common stock

80

Contractual entitlement of common stock

60

40

20

0
Distribution of sale proceeds for each firm
Fig. 1. This ﬁgure shows the distribution of sale proceeds between VCs and common stockholders in a sample of 50 VC-backed ﬁrms sold in 2003 or 2004.
Each bar represents a ﬁrm’s total sale price (in millions of dollars). The sale price is divided into three components: (1) the amount paid to VCs (in black),
(2) the carveout payment given to the original common stockholders (in red or grey), and (3) the contractual entitlement of the original common
stockholders at the given sale price (in white). Thus, the VCs’ contractual entitlement is represented by the sum of (1) and (2). The payout received by the
VCs is represented by (1). The payout received by the original common shareholders is represented by the sum of (2) and (3). Although deviations from
VCs’ cash ﬂow rights (i.e. carveouts) occurred in 11 ﬁrms, only nine are visible in the graph above. The remaining two carveouts are too small to be seen.
For ease of presentation, all ﬁrms sold for more than $100 million are normalized to a purchase price of $100 million.

Table 3 describes the deviations from cash ﬂow rights
in our sample.6 Deviations occur in only 11 sales (22% of
the 50 ﬁrm sample) and tend to be relatively small. In this
subset of 11 ﬁrms, the average deviation in favor of
common stock is $3.7 million and the average Realization
Rate for VCs is 89%. The lowest Realization Rate is 73% and
the largest absolute deviation is $10 million. Among all 50
companies, VCs’ average Realization Rate is 97.7% (or 98.1%

6
Table 3 reports only renegotiations of VCs’ cash ﬂow rights that
occurred in connection with the sale of the ﬁrm. Our data also suggest,
however, that VCs’ cash ﬂow rights are sometimes altered in connection
with a round of ﬁnancing. For example, in 13 rounds of ﬁnancing VC
investors gave up a portion of their liquidation preferences from earlier
ﬁnancing rounds (Table 1, Panel C, recap ﬁnancings). Contractual priority
rights might be reduced as part of a voluntary recapitalization of the
ﬁrm, perhaps to eliminate debt overhang (Myers, 1977). Alternatively,
pay-to-play provisions may force a VC to convert to common stock (and
thereby give up its preferences) if it fails to participate in a subsequent
ﬁnancing round.

on a dollar-weighted basis), and common stockholders
receive, on average, only $810,000 more than their
contractual entitlement. Consistent with Hellmann
(2006), all the deviations occurred in ﬁrms in which the
VCs exit holding preferred stock. These ﬁgures suggest
that, overall, VCs’ cash ﬂow rights are robust, even when
VCs exit asserting their liquidation preferences.
In theory, Realization Rate could exceed one. If common
shareholders favor a sale opposed by the VCs, they might
give up a portion of their cash ﬂow rights to preferredowning VCs to induce the reluctant VCs to support the
sale. Had such renegotiation occurred in our sample, we
could have observed it. However, among our ﬁrms,
Realization Rate never exceeds one.
Fig. 1 illustrates the distribution of sale proceeds
between common stockholders and VCs. Each bar’s
height represents a ﬁrm’s sale price. The sale price is
divided into three components: (1) the amount paid to
VCs (in black), (2) any carveout from VCs’ cash ﬂow rights
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extracted by common stockholders (in red or grey), and
(3) common shareholders’ contractual entitlement,
assuming VCs’ cash ﬂow rights were fully respected (in
white). The VCs’ cash ﬂow rights are the sum of (1) and
(2). The payment to common shareholders is the sum of
(2) and (3).
5. Explaining deviations: common shareholder power
VCs might give up part of their cash ﬂow rights for
reasons other than common shareholder’s ability to
holdup a sale. For example, VCs may wish to establish a
reputation for being fair to common shareholders. Thus,
we cannot infer from the existence of deviations from VCs’
cash ﬂow rights that they are caused by common shareholders’ holdup power. In this section, we test whether
common shareholder holdup power can explain the
observed deviations from VCs’ cash ﬂow rights. We
estimate, using ordinary least squares (OLS) and Tobit
regression, the following equation for deviation from VCs’
cash ﬂow rights:
Realization Rate ¼ Fðholdup power; controlsÞ

ð1Þ

Because Realization Rate never exceeds one, a concern
could arise that our dependent variable is censored. If
Realization Rate were technically or observationally censored at one, Tobit would be an appropriate estimation
technique (Wooldridge, 2002). However, neither type of
censoring seems to be present in our setting. Realization
Rate could take on values greater than one, and nothing
would prevent us from observing such occurrences. Given
this structure, we ﬁrst estimate Eq. (1) using OLS.
However, to account for the possibility that our data are
technically censored, in Section 5.2 we reestimate Eq. (1)
using Tobit regression.
5.1. Empirical results
We use separate variables to test each hypothesis
about common shareholder power. Board Blocking is a
dummy variable equal to one if VCs lack board control at
the time of sale and equal to zero otherwise. For shareholder rights, we use a dummy variable, California, coded
to one if the ﬁrm is incorporated in California at the time
of sale and zero if it is incorporated in Delaware. Our
hypotheses predict that Board Blocking and California each
has a negative effect on VCs’ Realization Rate. Collectively,
we refer to Board Blocking and California as the ‘‘power
variables’’.
We also include numerous control variables to separate
the effect of common shareholders’ holdup power from
other factors that might affect deviations from VCs’ cash
ﬂow rights. We describe particular control variables
throughout the remainder of this section. Table 4 deﬁnes
all the variables used in our models and provides
summary statistics for each. Table 5 presents a
correlation matrix for the included variables.
Table 6 reports our multivariate regression results. We
control for various features of the sold company and the

Table 4
Variable deﬁnitions and summary statistics.
This table deﬁnes the variables used in Tables 5–7 and provides
descriptive statistics for each. Realization Rate equals the amount paid to
the VCs in connection with the sale divided by the VCs’ cash ﬂow rights;
Carveout (Y/N) is a binary dependent variable that equals one if the
original common shareholders received a carveout payment and zero
otherwise; Carveout ($) measures the amount received by common
shareholders in excess of their cash ﬂow rights in millions of dollars;
Board Blocking equals zero if the VCs control more than half the board
seats at the time of sale and one otherwise; California equals one if the
company was incorporated in California at the time of sale; Founder CEO
is a dummy equal to one if a founder was the chief executive ofﬁcer
(CEO) at the time of sale and zero if a professional CEO had been
appointed; Rounds of Financing measures the number of rounds of VC
ﬁnancing; Total Invested equals the total amount invested in the
company prior to sale (in millions of dollars); Serial Entrepreneur is a
dummy variable set to one if one of the company’s founders had
previously founded another company and zero otherwise; Management
Bonus (%) records the sum of any non-retention bonuses awarded to the
startup’s employees in connection with the sale as a percent of the sale
price; Public Acquirer equals one if the acquirer was publicly traded at
the time of sale and zero otherwise; VC Age is a proxy for VC reputation
and is set equal to the year the startup was acquired minus the average of
the yeras in which the company’s lead VC investors were founded; Proﬁt
is a dummy equal to one if the VCs’ contractual entitlement at sale was
greater than the amount invested in the company, and zero otherwise;
Washout equals one if the common shareholders’ contractual entitlement is $0, and zero otherwise; Log |PriceLP| equals the natural log of
the absolute value of the difference between the sale price and the
aggregate liquidation preferences at the time of sale (in millions); and VC
Conversion is a dummy variable set to one if the VCs convert their
preferred shares to common shares in connection with the sale of the
ﬁrm.
Variable

Mean

Median

Standard deviation

Realization Rate
Carveout (Y/N)
Carveout ($)
Board Blocking
California
Founder CEO
Rounds of Financing
Total Invested
Serial Entrepreneur
Management Bonus (%)
Public Acquirer
VC Age
Proﬁt
Washout
Log |PriceLP|
VC Conversion

0.98
0.22
0.81
0.42
0.30
0.38
3.00
42.18
0.46
0.02
0.72
15.91
0.40
0.62
3.07
0.16

1
0
0
0
0
0
3
31
0
0
1
14.5
0
1
2.94
0

0.06
0.42
2.20
0.50
0.46
0.49
1.12
36.67
0.50
0.04
0.45
10.01
0.49
0.49
1.26
0.37

acquirer. To account for stage of development, we
measure the number of Rounds of Financing. To proxy for
ﬁrm size and the amount VCs have at stake, we use total
amount invested (Total Invested). We use a dummy
variable, Serial Entrepreneur, to indicate if any of the
ﬁrm’s founders had previously started another ﬁrm. We
use a dummy variable, Founder CEO, to indicate if the CEO
at sale was one of the original founders. Management
Bonus (%) records any nonretention bonuses paid to
management in connection with the sale, as a
percentage of sale price.7 To control for acquirer

7
In 16 of the 42 ﬁrms in our sample, non-retention bonuses
(payments not contingent on continued employment with the acquirer)
were given to management (including but not necessarily limited to the
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Table 5
Pairwise correlation matrix.
The table shows pairwise correlations among the variables in a sample of 50 VC-backed ﬁrms sold in 2003 or 2004. Correlations signiﬁcant at the 5%
level or better are highlighted in bold. Deﬁnitions and summary statistics for each variable are provided in Table 4.
Variable
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

Board Blocking
California
Founder CEO
Rounds of Financing
Total Invested
Serial Entrepreneur
Management Bonus (%)
Public Acquirer
VC Age
Proﬁt
Washout
Log |Price – LP|
VC Conversion
Realization Rate
Carveout (Y/N)
Carveout ($)

1

2

3

4

5

6

–
0.29
0.34
0.29
0.00
0.19
0.13
0.26
0.22
0.38
0.34
0.05
0.29
0.26
0.14
0.27

–
0.42
0.20
0.12
0.25
0.06
0.18
0.02
0.18
0.06
0.10
0.29
0.03
0.07
0.08

–
0.41
0.17
0.10
0.01
0.21
0.29
0.37
0.24
0.06
0.33
0.32
0.18
0.34

–
0.45
0.07
0.13
0.08
0.07
0.48
0.37
0.14
0.29
0.04
0.09
0.01

–
0.07
0.10
0.16
0.03
0.15
0.08
0.14
0.26
0.12
0.07
0.02

–
0.01
0.05
0.16
0.07
0.02
0.02
0.07
0.16
0.10
0.14

ﬁnancial structure, we use a dummy variable, Public
Acquirer, set to one if the acquirer was publicly traded at
the time of sale. Following Gompers (1996), we account
for VC reputation by measuring the average age of the VC
ﬁrms leading each round of ﬁnancing (VC Age).8 Model 1
estimates the effect of our two power variables (Board
Blocking and California) on Realization Rate, with the above
control variables as covariates.
The ability and incentive of common stockholders to
renegotiate VCs’ cash ﬂow rights could depend on the
relation between the sale price and VCs’ investment, and
on the relation between the sale price and VCs’ cash ﬂow
rights. In Model 2, we add three variables to control for
these possibilities. First, we control for whether the VCs
are entitled to receive the entire sale price (a washout). In
a washout, common stockholders would get nothing and
thus have little to lose by blocking the sale. To capture this

(footnote continued)
CEO) upon closing the sale. Because such payments beneﬁt individuals
who often hold (and can vote) large amounts of common stock, they
could be considered, at least in part, disguised non-pro-rata payment to
common shareholders, instead of payments to employees. However, to
be conservative in our measurement of deviation from VCs’ cash ﬂow
rights we assume that management bonuses are not payments to
managers as common shareholders, but rather payments to managers as
employees.
If these management bonuses are disguised payments to common
stockholders, they should be treated as (a) part of the value available to
common and preferred shareholders upon sale and (b) paid to common
shareholders. To determine whether this treatment affects our crosssectional results, we ran regressions on a modiﬁed realization rate that
treated non-retention management bonuses as part of the sale price and
therefore available to shareholders as a group, but paid only to common
shareholders. In these (unreported) regressions the coefﬁcient estimates
for our power variables are similar to (though less signiﬁcant than) the
results reported in Table 6.
8
We also code for VC reputation based on dollars under management and VC location (Lerner, 1995). These alternative measures are
highly correlated with VC Age. The use of VC Age instead of these other
measures does not affect our ﬁndings.

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15 16

–
0.18
–
0.02 0.11
–
0.39
0.33 0.12
–
0.37 0.30
0.17 0.87
–
–
0.22
0.19 0.04
0.31 0.26
0.24
0.27 0.24
0.53 0.56
0.26
–
0.27 0.24
0.05 0.07 0.16
0.21
0.17
–
0.23
0.22 0.10 0.04
0.22 0.29 0.23 0.75
–
0.07
0.23 0.11
0.20
0.02 0.17 0.16 0.81 0.71

–

effect, we code Washout equal to one when the VCs have a
right to receive the entire sale price and zero otherwise.
Second, VCs’ bargaining incentives might depend on
whether VCs would make a proﬁt if their cash ﬂow rights
were fully respected. If VCs are loss-averse, they may be
less willing to offer a carveout when they lose money on
their investment. To control for this possibility, we code
Proﬁt as one if the VCs would make a proﬁt and zero
otherwise.
Third, we control for the unrealized option value of
common stock. The higher the option value, the more
common shareholders have to lose in the sale and the
harder they might negotiate for a carveout. Option value is
likely to decline with the distance between the sale price
and the VCs’ liquidation preferences. If the sale price is
signiﬁcantly below (instead of just below) the VCs’
liquidation preferences, a future sale is less likely to be
at a price that exceeds those preferences. Similarly, if the
sale price is signiﬁcantly above (instead of just above) the
liquidation preferences, the likelihood that a future offer
will provide more value to common shareholders is also
lower. To control for unrealized option value, we calculate
the natural log of the absolute value of the difference
between the sale price and the VCs’ liquidation preferences at the time of sale (Log|Price  LP|).
In Model 2, we also use a dummy variable (VC
Conversion) to control for whether the VCs convert to
common stock in connection with the sale, thereby giving
up their liquidation preferences. Because VCs convert only
if the common shares are relatively valuable, common
shareholder opposition and renegotiation of VCs’ cash
ﬂow rights are less likely when VCs convert to common
stock.
In Model 3, we add dummy variables for the law ﬁrm
representing the ﬁrm at the time of sale. The law ﬁrm can
inﬂuence the choice of corporate law and other governance arrangements. The law ﬁrm can also affect how the
sale is structured and might discourage (or encourage) the
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Table 6
Multivariate regression.
This table reports ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions on a sample of 50 VC-backed ﬁrms sold in 2003 or 2004. The dependent variable in Models
1–4 is Realization Rate, which measures the fraction of the VCs’ cash ﬂow rights that was actually paid to the VCs. The dependent variable in Model 5 is
Carveout ($), measuring deviations from VCs’ cash ﬂow rights in millions of dollars. Model 6 uses a linear probability model (OLS) to estimate a binary
dependent variable, Carveout (Y/N), which equals one if a carveout payment was awarded to the original common shareholders and zero otherwise. All
explanatory variables are deﬁned in Table 4. Heteroskedastic-robust (White, 1980) standard errors are reported in parentheses below each coefﬁcient
estimate. We use a 2-sided test for statistical signiﬁcance (*=10% signiﬁcance; **=5% signiﬁcance; ***=1% signiﬁcance).
Variable

OLS
Realization Rate

Power Variable
Board Blocking
California
Control Variable
Rounds of Financing
Total Invested
Serial Entrepreneur
Founder CEO
Management Bonus (%)
Public Acquirer
VC Age

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.031*
(0.018)
0.034**
(0.016)

0.042**
(0.018)
0.031*
(0.016)

0.046**
(0.020)
0.032**
(0.015)

0.040***
(0.014)
0.020
(0.014)

1.506**
(0.602)
1.599*
(0.800)

0.269*
(0.137)
0.168
(0.143)

0.011
(0.006)
0.0004**
(0.0002)
0.019
(0.017)
0.041**
(0.018)
0.451
(0.368)
0.020
(0.015)
0.0003
(0.0008)

N
N
1.061
(0.033)

0.013**
(0.006)
0.0004**
(0.0002)
0.014
(0.015)
0.027**
(0.012)
0.352
(0.378)
0.028*
(0.016)
0.0012*
(0.0006)
0.110**
(0.040)
0.105**
(0.039)
0.006
(0.004)
0.047**
(0.021)
N
N
1.133
(0.048)

0.014**
(0.006)
0.0004**
(0.0002)
0.018
(0.014)
0.026*
(0.014)
0.459
(0.363)
0.013
(0.017)
0.0014*
(0.0007)
0.107**
(0.046)
0.099**
(0.045)
0.008*
(0.005)
0.051**
(0.021)
Y
N
1.117
(0.056)

0.013**
(0.005)
0.0006**
(0.0002)
0.011
(0.012)
0.016
(0.013)
0.389
(0.339)
0.032**
(0.014)
0.0017**
(0.0007)
0.116***
(0.029)
0.116***
(0.027)
0.009**
(0.004)
0.051***
(0.018)
N
Y
1.078
(0.036)

0.566**
(0.248)
0.010
(0.006)
0.508
(0.553)
1.274*
(0.630)
3.003
(4.745)
1.009**
(0.398)
0.050**
(0.024)
4.311**
(1.958)
3.514**
(1.866)
0.259
(0.197)
2.080**
(0.949)
N
N
5.075
(2.211)

0.106
(0.066)
0.003**
(0.001)
0.110
(0.111)
0.117
(0.135)
1.149
(1.757)
0.253*
(0.130)
0.010
(0.007)
0.649***
(0.151)
0.653***
(0.154)
0.067
(0.041)
0.394**
(0.174)
N
N
0.574
(0.281)

0.33
50

0.60
50

0.66
50

0.70
50

0.60
50

0.52
50

Washout
Log |Price  LP|
VC Conversion

R2
Number of Observations

Carveout (Y/N)

(1)

Proﬁt

Law ﬁrm dummies
Industry dummies
Constant

Carveout ($)

payment of a carveout to common shareholders. We use a
separate dummy variable for each law ﬁrm that represented at least ﬁve ﬁrms. In our sample, three law ﬁrms
met this criterion Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati
(representing ten ﬁrms), Cooley Godward (representing
eight ﬁrms), and Venture Law Group (representing eight
ﬁrms).
In Model 4, we add industry dummy variables. We use
the industry classiﬁcation provided by www.linksv.com
for each ﬁrm. We include industry dummy variables for
Biotech, Telecom, Software, and Other IT. Internet is the
excluded category.
The results displayed in Table 6, Models 1–4, provide
preliminary support for our two holdup power hypotheses. Board Blocking and California are each negatively
correlated with Realization Rate in all models, and each is
statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level or better in most

models. Our results are robust to various controls and to
law ﬁrm and industry effects. We ﬁnd that that the extent
of common shareholders’ holdup power predicts renegotiation of VCs’ cash ﬂow rights.
To illustrate the relation between common shareholder
power and deviations from VCs’ cash ﬂow rights, we
construct an index for common stockholder power. The
index is created by summing Board Blocking and California
for each ﬁrm. The resulting Common Stockholder Power
Index ranges from zero to two, with higher scores
representing greater holdup power for common stockholders. The downward sloping curve in Fig. 2 indicates
that VC Realization Rate is lower when common
shareholders have more holdup power. Immediately
below the diagram in Fig. 2 is a table summarizing the
frequency and magnitude of deviations conditional on the
index of common stockholder power. The graph and table
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VC Realization Rate
Fitted values

1

Realization Rate

0.95
0.9
0.85
0.8
0.75
0.7
0

1
Common Stockholder Power Index

2

Deviations conditional on common stock power index

Fig. 2. Using a sample of 50 VC-backed ﬁrms sold in 2003 or 2004, this ﬁgure shows the Realization Rate for each ﬁrm in relationship to an index of
common stockholder power. The index is created by summing the shareholder power variables for each ﬁrm: California and Board Blocking. The resulting
Common Stockholder Power Index ranges from 0 to 2, with higher scores representing greater holdup power. The ﬁtted line illustrates that increasing
common stock’s holdup power predicts a lower Realization Rate. Because 39 ﬁrms have a Realization Rate of 1, this diagram plots several points directly
on top of each other. Of the 39 ﬁrms with a Realization Rate of 1, there are 15 with a common stockholder power index of 0, 22 with a common
stockholder power index of 1, and two with a common stock power index of 2. The table immediately below the diagram shows for each common
stockholder power index score, the number of carveouts awarded, the average realization rate, and the average carveout to common (in millions of
dollars).

make clear that additional sources of holdup power are
associated with larger and more frequent deviations from
VCs’ cash ﬂow rights.
We consider the economic signiﬁcance of common
shareholder power in ﬁrms in which the VCs exit holding
preferred stock. We reestimate Model 2 using the dollar
value of carveout payments awarded to common stockholders, Carveout ($), as our dependent variable. Results
are reported in Model 5. In our sample, common stockholders can expect to receive an extra $1.5 million when
the VCs lack board control and an extra $1.6 million when
the ﬁrm is incorporated in California, which gives
common shareholders more leverage against VCs than
Delaware corporate law.
Common shareholder power should affect the frequency as well as the expected magnitude of deviation
from VCs’ cash ﬂow rights when ﬁrms are sold. To test this
hypothesis, we generate a new binary dependent variable,
Carveout (Y/N), that equals one if a carveout is paid to
common stockholders and zero otherwise. Because a
maximum likelihood estimator (i.e., probit) could generate biased estimates in a sample of 50 ﬁrms, we use
a linear probability model. Our results are shown in

Model 6. As our hypotheses would predict, each measure
of shareholder power increases the likelihood of deviation. However, while Board Blocking remains statistically
signiﬁcant, California does not.
Incentives in the eight ﬁrms in which the VCs convert
to common stock could be different than in the other 42
ﬁrms in which VCs exit holding preferred stock with
liquidation preferences. To focus exclusively on those sales
in which contractual priority is implicated, we reestimate
Realization Rate limited to the 42 ﬁrms in the VC preferred
sample. Results are reported in Table 7, under Models 7
and 8. Similar to the models described above, both power
variables (Board Control and California) have a negative
and signiﬁcant effect on Realization Rate.
5.2. Robustness checks
In this sub-section, we estimate a censored regression
model, test for outliers, and address the possibility of
spurious causation.
Because Realization Rate is clustered at one for a large
portion of our sample, we are concerned that our
dependent variable could be technically censored. To
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Table 7
Robustness checks.
This table reports ordinary least squares (OLS) and Tobit regressions on a sample of 50 VC-backed ﬁrms sold in 2003 or 2004. The dependent variable in
each regression is Realization Rate, which measures the fraction of the VCs’ cash ﬂow rights that was paid to the VCs. Models 7 and 8 are limited to the 42
ﬁrms in which the VCs held preferred stock at the time of the sale. Models 9 and 10 estimate Realization Rate using Tobit regression, right censored at one.
All other explanatory variables are deﬁned in Table 4. Heteroskedastic-robust (White, 1980) standard errors are reported in parentheses below each
coefﬁcient estimate. We use a two-sided test for statistical signiﬁcance (*=10% signiﬁcance; **=5% signiﬁcance; ***=1% signiﬁcance).
Variable

Power Variable
Board Blocking
California
Control Variable
Rounds of Financing
Total Invested
Serial Entrepreneur
Founder CEO
Management Bonus (%)
Public Acquirer
VC Age

OLS
(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

0.055**
(0.022)
0.028*
(0.016)

0.055**
(0.020)
0.035**
(0.017)

0.110*
(0.065)
0.133*
(0.072)

0.128**
(0.051)
0.102**
(0.049)

0.011
(0.007)
0.0006***
(0.0002)
0.008
(0.017)
0.050**
(0.020)
0.318
(0.327)
0.029
(0.018)
0.0013*
(0.0007)

0.065*
(0.035)
0.002
(0.002)
0.002
(0.054)
0.121
(0.072)
1.313**
(0.612)
0.130
(0.091)
0.001
(0.003)

N
N
1.032
(0.030)

0.012**
(0.006)
0.0005***
(0.0002)
0.010
(0.017)
0.035**
(0.014)
0.330
(0.340)
0.028
(0.018)
0.0016**
(0.0007)
0.102**
(0.041)
0.103**
(0.039)
0.008*
(0.004)
N
N
1.116
(0.048)

N
N
1.473
(0.172)

0.069**
(0.029)
0.003*
(0.001)
0.027
(0.039)
0.033
(0.059)
0.878*
(0.488)
0.159**
(0.077)
0.005**
(0.002)
0.194**
(0.088)
0.263***
(0.068)
0.036*
(0.021)
N
N
1.509
(0.162)

0.48
–
42

0.65
–
42

–
3.36
50

–
6.38
50

Proﬁt
Washout
Log |Price  LP|
Law ﬁrm dummies
Industry dummies
Constant
R2
Log likelihood
Number of observations

Tobit

address this possibility we reestimate our model using
Tobit regression. Models 9 and 10 report Tobit coefﬁcients,
with Realization Rate right censored at one. Similar to the
OLS results reported above, Board Blocking and California
each has a negative and signiﬁcant effect on Realization
Rate in both Tobit models.
To determine whether our results are driven by outliers,
we estimate DFbeta coefﬁcients for our treatment variables. This technique measures the effect of each observation on an estimated coefﬁcient by determining how much
that coefﬁcient changes when the given observation is
dropped from the sample. An observation that generates a
DFbeta value exceeding one in absolute value is considered
problematic (Bollen and Jackman, 1990). In our sample,
only one observation generated a DFbeta above this critical
value. In Model 2, one observation generated a DFbeta
value for Board Blocking of 1.56. If this observation is
dropped, however, the coefﬁcient for Board Blocking in
Model 2 is still negative (0.023 instead of 0.042 for the
full 50-ﬁrm sample), and signiﬁcant at the 10% level,
suggesting that our results are not driven by outliers.

We consider the possibility of simultaneity or reverse
causation problems: that deviations could cause, or be
contemporaneous with, changes in our treatment variables. In fact, no signiﬁcant corporate governance changes
occur in the immediate vicinity of a sale in our sample.
While four ﬁrms reincorporated from California to Delaware, each reincorporation occurred at least two years
before the sale. Control of the board did not change in the
three months immediately prior to any sale.9

9
Although VCs would beneﬁt from reducing common shareholders’
holdup power right before the sale, this would be difﬁcult for them to do,
especially on short notice. For example, the VCs cannot unilaterally
increase their board seats, whose allocation is contractually determined.
And reincorporation out of California into Delaware can be blocked or
delayed, even by a minority of the common shareholders, the group that
would be hurt the most from a reincorporation. Under the California
Corporations Code, state approval is required for such reincorporation.
See Cal. Corp Code 25120-42. When no shareholders object, such
approval is typically quickly granted. But if a single shareholder objects,
the state may investigate the ‘‘fairness’’ of the reincorporation, delaying
the transaction.
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Finally, we consider whether our results are driven by
omitted variables that correlate both with observed
common shareholder power measures and with deviations from VCs’ cash ﬂow rights. Resolving causation in
corporate governance settings is difﬁcult, as almost all the
relevant variables are endogenous (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). We reduce, but cannot eliminate entirely, the
risk of unobserved heterogeneity by controlling for a
broad range of factors and by limiting our sample to VCbacked companies that were located in one area (Silicon
Valley) and sold during a narrow period of time. Ideally,
one would address the omitted variable problem by
instrumenting for each treatment variable or otherwise
estimating a system of reduced form equations. In our
case, however, a good instrument is simply not available.
Instead, we estimate the sensitivity of our ﬁndings to
omitted variables using a new technique developed by
Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005) for evaluating causation in
nonexperimental settings such as ours. Altonji, Elder, and
Taber (2005) suggest that the correlation between a
treatment variable and the other observed covariates is
informative about the likely extent of correlation between
the treatment variable and unobserved variables excluded
from the model. Given certain assumptions, one can
calculate an upper bound on the extent of omitted variable
bias. The details of this technique and its application to our
study can be found in Appendix A. The analysis suggests
that the observed correlation between common shareholder power and deviation from VCs’ cash ﬂow rights is
not spurious. While it cannot prove that our coefﬁcient
estimates are unbiased, it implies that any omitted variable
bias is unlikely to be large enough to change the coefﬁcient
signs on either treatment variable. These robustness checks,
together with our theory and econometric results, support
our hypothesis that common shareholder holdup power
causes renegotiation of VCs’ cash ﬂow rights.
Discussions with Silicon Valley venture capitalists,
lawyers, and the entrepreneurs supplying us with data
provide additional conﬁrmation that we have correctly
identiﬁed the causal process: that common shareholder
power affects the likelihood and extent of the deviation
from VCs’ cash ﬂow rights. In one California-domiciled
ﬁrm, for example, the VCs carving out a portion of their
liquidation preferences for common shareholders required
each common stockholder to sign a liability waiver before
receiving a portion of the carveout. According to the
entrepreneur, the carveout was offered only because the
VCs were concerned about a possible common shareholder
suit challenging the terms of the sale. In another case, in
which the VCs lacked board control, the entrepreneur told
us that the VCs were forced to give a carveout payment to
common shareholders to obtain the support of other
directors for the sale. These accounts give us additional
conﬁdence that deviations from VCs’ cash ﬂow rights are
driven, at least in part, by common shareholder power.

6. Conclusion
Using a hand-collected data set of Silicon Valley
VC-backed ﬁrms, we investigate whether common stock-
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holders use their holdup power to extract part of VCs’ cash
ﬂow rights in connection with private sales, the most
common form of VC exit. We ﬁnd that VCs’ cash ﬂow
rights are sometimes renegotiated. However, when such
renegotiation occurs, the deviation from VCs’ cash ﬂow
rights is relatively small. Across all the ﬁrms in our
sample, the average dollar-weighted deviation is 1.9%. We
ﬁnd that such deviations are more likely to occur when
VCs exit as preferred shareholders rather than convert to
common stock. We also show that the likelihood and
magnitude of deviations from VCs’ cash ﬂow rights are are
larger when VCs have less power relative to common
shareholders. In particular, common-favoring deviations
are more likely to occur and are larger when VCs lack
board control and when state corporate law gives
common shareholders more leverage.
Our study contributes to a better understanding of how
VCs exit their investments. We also provide support for
incomplete ﬁnancial contracting theories developed by
Aghion and Bolton (1992) and Hellmann (2006). In
addition, our results provide the ﬁrst evidence that ﬁrms’
choice of corporate law can affect ﬁnancial outcomes in
nonpublic companies.
Our work suggests a number of interesting avenues for
future research. It would be worth investigating sales of
VC-backed ﬁrms in locations outside Silicon Valley and in
other time periods to determine whether our ﬁndings
generalize to other settings. Because ﬁrms are usually
incorporated either in their home state or in Delaware, a
study of sales outside California would enable researchers
to test the difference between Delaware law and the laws
of other states. This, in turn, could enable researchers to
better determine the speciﬁc features of corporate law
that tend to give common shareholders more power
relative to VCs. It would also be worthwhile to examine
the ex ante effects of common shareholder power, such as
whether it affects not only how VCs exit but also when
they exit. We hope our study convinces scholars of the
interest and importance of pursuing such research and is
useful to courts, legislatures, and practitioners seeking to
better understand and improve the corporate governance
of VC-backed ﬁrms.

Appendix A. Sensitivity to unobserved variables
We estimate the sensitivity of our ﬁndings to omitted
variables using a technique developed by Altonji, Elder,
and Taber (2005). Their analysis assumes that the
variables included in a model are chosen randomly from
the vector of all characteristics (observable and unobservable) that determine the dependent variable. Under this
assumption they prove that (a) the normalized shift in the
unobservables conditioned on the relevant treatment
variable equals (b) the equivalent shift in the observables.
In other words, selection on the unobservables equals
selection on the observables. However, researchers do not
randomly select which variables to measure but intentionally choose variables to reduce bias, suggesting that
the amount of selection on the unobservables generally is
less than the amount of selection on the observables.
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Table A1
Data for calculating implied ratio of Eq. (3)/Eq. (4).
Power variables

b

[E(X0 g|C=1)E(X0 g|C=0)]/var(X0 g)

var(e)

var(C)/var(m)

Implied [E(e|C=1)E(e|C=0)]

Implied ratio

Board Blocking
California

0.055
0.035

4.214
14.631

0.0014
0.0014

1.633
1.386

0.034
0.025

5.627
1.212

Thus, Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005) argue that the
amount of selection on the observables can be treated as
an upper bound for the extent of omitted variable bias.
We apply Altonji, Elder, and Taber’s technique to
estimate the sensitivity of our results to omitted variables.
For each of our two treatment variables, we ﬁrst measure
the amount of selection on the other observed covariates,
and then we calculate how much selection on the
unobservables would be necessary for omitted variables
to completely explain away our result. This gives us an
implied ratio of selection on unobservables to selection on
observables. If the implied ratio is greater than one the
case for a causal link between the treatment variable and
the dependent variable is strengthened.
The following analysis applies to our results reported
in Table 7 under Model 8. The regression reported in
Model 8 can be expressed as:
Y ¼ a þ bC þ X 0 g þ e

ð2Þ

where Y is the Realization Rate, C is the relevant power
variable (Board Blocking or California), and X is a vector of
all other included explanatory variables excluding the
power variable. The concern is that cov(C,e) might not be
zero. We compare the normalized shift in the unobservables conditioned on the relevant power variable
[Eq. (3)] with the equivalent shift in the observables
[Eq. (4)]:
EðejC ¼ 1Þ  EðejC ¼ 0Þ
varðeÞ

ð3Þ

and
EðX 0 gjC ¼ 1Þ  EðX 0 gjC ¼ 0Þ
varðX 0 gÞ

Plim b ¼ b þ ½covðm; eÞ=varðmÞ
¼ b þ ½varðCÞ=varðmÞ½EðejC ¼ 1Þ  EðejC ¼ 0Þ:

ð6Þ

Our strategy is to ﬁnd the implied value of
[E(e|C=1)E(e|C=0)] that would cause the bias term to
exactly wash out the estimate for b. This can then be
substituted into Eq. (3).
Our implied estimate for [E(e|C=1)E(e|C=0)] equals b/
[var(C)/var(m)]. We can solve for this because Model 8
gives us b=0.055 and [var(C)/var(m)]=1.633. This provides an implied estimate [E(e|C=1)E(e|C=0)]=0.034,
which would exactly explain away our entire estimate for
b. Our estimate for [E(X0 g|C=1)E(X0 g|C=0)]/var(X0 g) is
4.214 and var(e) is 0.0014. This provides sufﬁcient
information to construct the implied ratio of Eqs. (3) over
(4), which we ﬁnd to be 5.627 in absolute value. To explain
away the entire estimated effect of Board Blocking on
Realization Rate, the unobservables would have to explain
5.6 times the variance in C as can be explained by the
observables.
Using the data reported in Table A1 we can use the
same steps to calculate the implied ratio for California. For
California we ﬁnd a ratio of 1.21. Because this is greater
than one in absolute value, following Altonji, Elder, and
Taber (2005), we consider it unlikely that omitted
variables could explain away our ﬁndings. Our result for
California, however, is less robust than our result for Board
Blocking.
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